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SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
Lightman v. Flaum'
(Decided March 4, 1999)
In a case of first impression, Plaintiff Chani Lightman brought
an action for breach of the clergy-penitent privilege pursuant to
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 45052 and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation?
Defendants, Rabbi Tzvi Flaum and Rabbi David Weinberger,
moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of action and
the court converted the motion to a summary judgment motion.4
Defendants claimed that Jewish law compelled them to disclose
the confidences, that the plaintiff waived the clergy-penitent
privilege by having a third person present,5 and that the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution6 protected their
action.7 The Supreme Court, Queens County, held that the plaintiff
could bring an action for breach of the clergy-penitent privilege,
and that unless the factual issues at trial showed that "the
privilege had been waived by the presence of a third person' 's or
the nature of the meeting was not for spiritual guidance or was not
1 179 Misc. 2d 1007,687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1999).
2 N.Y. C.P.L.R. §4505 (McKinney 1992). §4505 provides: "Unless the
person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other
minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner, shall
not be allowed disclose [sic] a confession or confidence made to him in his
professional character as spiritual advisor." This rule grants permission to a
member of the clergy given a privileged communication to remain silent when
asked to testify about the communication, without incurring the penalty of
perjury.
3 179 Misc. 2d at 1008, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
4 Id at 1009, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
5 Id at 1010, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." Id.
7 179 Misc. 2d at 1013-14, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
8 Id at 1018, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
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made "to the Rabbis in their spiritual capacity,"9 the defendants
would be liable.1"
In 1995, plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, sought religious counseling
from the defendants, during which she disclosed that she had
stopped her religious bathing" so that she "would not have to
engage in sexual relations with [her husband], Dr. Lightman."' 2
Rabbi Flaum claimed that Dr. Lightman met with him because the
couple was having marital difficulty, and perhaps his wife was
engaging in "adulterous relationships."' 3 Subsequently, plaintiff,
accompanied by her mother, berated Rabbi Flaum for speaking to
her husband, but admitted "'she had stopped engaging in religious
purification laws' and was 'seeing other men in social settings.""' 4
Plaintiff told Rabbi Weinberger that her husband could not relate
to her, and "she was not getting fulfillment" from him.'5 Rabbi
Weinberger claims that the plaintiff described "the most intimate
details of her marriage" to him while her friend, Yael Hirsch, was
present.6 In February 1996, Mrs. Lightman filed for divorce from
her husband, and for "temporary custody of her four children." 7
Both Rabbis admitted to notifying her husband of their
conversations with her through affirmations" provided to support
9Id.
10 Id.; see also People v. Drelich, 123 A.D.2d 441, 443, 506 N.Y.S.2d 746,
748 (2d Dep't 1986) (where a communication was made to a Rabbi, but his role
was secular in nature, so the communication would not be privileged).
I Idat 1016, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 570. The Mikvah is "a ritual bathing to purify
the woman during her menstrual period." Without purification, the husband
could violate Jewish law or traditioh by engaging in marital relations.
12 Id. at 1009, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
'" Lightman, 179 Misc. 2d. at 1010-11,687 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
14 Id. at 1011,687 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
IS Id. at 1009, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
16 Id. at 1010, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
17 Id. at 1009, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
"8 Lightman, 179 Misc. 2d. at 687 N.Y.S.2d at 565; see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 59 (6th ed. 1990) (defining affrmnation as "[a] solemn religious
asseveration in the nature of an oath"). Defendants claimed that "breach of the
privilege is merely a violation of an evidentiary rule, and that the sole remedy is
the exclusion of the communication from evidence." Id. at 1010, 687 N.Y.S.2d
at 566.
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Dr. Lightman's custody position, and both felt that they had a
religious obligation to do so.1 9
The court compared the breach of clergy-penitent privilege to
other professional violations of privileges, and noted that a
common law cause of action for breach of this fiduciary duty of
confidentiality would be an issue of first impression."0 Because the
clergy was normally careful about making disclosures, the issue
never arose.2 The court recognized the tension between the Free
Exercise Clause and the C.P.L.R. clergy-penitent privilege, citing
the only case addressing the issue, a California Court of Appeals
case, Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church.2- Snyder expressed
a four-prong balancing standard to determine whether significant
societal interests justified placing a burden on religious expression:
First, the government must be in furtherance of some
compelling state interest; second, the burden on
religious expression must be essential to further the
government's compelling state interest; third, the type
and level of the burden must be the minimum
necessary to achieve the state interest; [and,] fourth,
the burden must apply to everyone, not merely to those
who have a religious belief?3
9 Id at 1011,687 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
20 Id at 1011,687 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (the court did not elaborate how the breach
of an evidentiary rule could be extended to a cause of action for conduct
occurring outside of the courtroom). See Oringer v. Rotkin, 162 A.D.2d 113,
556 N.Y.S2d 67 (1st Dep't 1990) for the proposition that a breach of
psychologist-patient privilege amounts to a common law cause of action. See
also MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482,446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1982)
(breach of psychiatrist-patient privilege); Harley v. Druzba, 169 A.D.2d 1001,
565 N.Y.S.2d 278 (3d Dep't 1991) (violation of social worker-client privilege);
Doe v. Roe, 190 A.D.2d 463, 599 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1993) (violation of
doctor-patient privilege); and Krouner v. Koplovitz, 175 A.D.2d 531, 572
N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1991) (breach of the attorney-client privilege).
21 Lightman, 179 Misc. 2d. at 1012, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
' Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640 (6th Dist.
1989) (where divulging confidences by clergy without a religious expression
justification could amount to liability in tort).
23 Snyder, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (citing Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology,
260 Cal. Rptr. 331,339 (2d Dist. 1989)).
2000
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In Snyder, both parties were involved in an extra-marital affair,
each confessed to church elders, and each requested that church
officials not divulge the communication.' Less than a week later,
the elders disclosed the privileged communication "to the
assembled congregation [during] Sunday services."'  The Snyder
court held that defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction could not be sustained by a general assertion that
religion motivated their conduct.26 The California Court of Appeals
remanded Snyder for the threshold "determination whether there
was a religious purpose for the disclosure," which if found would
trigger the balancing standard.27 The Lightman court applied the
same reasoning to a broader disclosure, and rather than granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment, sought a finding of fact
at trial whether there was a religious purpose for the disclosure.28
The Lightman court discussed several general legal principles
where the First Amendment would serve as a defense. If a court
were excessively entangled with religious doctrine and standards,
then the First Amendment would apply.29 It would also apply if
the ruling of the court did not refrain from answering ecclesiastic
questions?0 The court reiterated the general standard that civil
24 Id. at 642.
2s Id. at 642.
26 Id. at 648 (reasoning that far greater harm would come from giving
deference to and thus favoring those who assert that their conduct was a
religious matter rather than a civil matter).
27 Lightman, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (noting that the lower court dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction was reversed).
28 Id. at 571. The disclosure was broader because it was made to the entire
world through the Rabbis' affirmations rather than to just the congregation.
29 Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Ironically, the
Schmidt court finds that imposing a duty of care on the clergy would violate the
third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for determining unconstitutional
government infringement of religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-3
(1971). The standard test provides in pertinent part: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.., finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'Id.
10 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (finding that a civil award could amount to a
determination of an ecclesiastic question).
[Vol 16
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disputes should be resolved without delving into underlying
religious doctrine by applying neutral principles of law.3'
Defendants claim that when abridgement of the free exercise of
religion occurs, historically there can be no imposition of liability
in tort against religious societies or their members a- The court
cited the case of Oregon v. Smith where two drug rehabilitation
counselors employed by a private firm were dismissed for taking
peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, as part of a Native American
Church ceremony.33 They were denied unemployment benefits
because they were let go for work-related "misconduct."'  The
Oregon Supreme Court ruled that even though the religious
conduct violated state statute, which did not provide for a religious
use exception, their conduct could not serve as a basis for denial of
unemployment benefits.35  The United States Supreme Court
disagreed.36  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that the
First Amendment does not prohibit the regulation of conduct of a
religious entity for the protection of society, especially when such
conduct violates religion-neutral laws of general applicability.'
31 Id. at 449. The danger arises when civil property awards are made to
ecclesiastic entities, thus "establishing" a church where none may have existed
before.
32 Lightman at 1014, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220 (1972) which held that there is some "religiously grounded
conduct, protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment" which
falls outside of the State's police power "to control, even under regulations of
general applicability").
3 Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. App.1985).
34 Id at 1277.
1 Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 150 (Or. 1988).
36 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990).
3 Id at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982)). See
also id at 886 n. 3 (where there is a valid and neutral law, of general
applicability, an impingement of individual spiritual beliefs does not make the
law unconstitutional as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This is a
rational relation test-if a legislator can rationally believe that the law is needed,
it is constitutional. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
486 (1955)). However, if the lav were not neutral, one that singles out a
particular religion for advancement or inhibition, then the strict scrutiny
standard would apply. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 529 (1993) (where intent plays a role, and where there is
2000
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The Lightman court noted that the Free Exercise Clause "may
only serve as a defense where the alleged tortious conduct was
undertaken pursuant to religious principles or doctrine."3 If the
ecclesiastic tortfeasor founded the alleged conduct on religious
beliefs, such conduct may still impose liability if outweighed by a
significant societal interest.39 The court cited Kenneth R. v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,' which found a valid cause of
intent to single out a religion, strict scrutiny applies). Even in a case where a
statute seems neutral on its face, but is unequally applied, strict scrutiny would
lie. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (stating that a statute,
otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race). Similarly, if C.P.L.R. §4505 were applied so
as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of religion, §4505 would be rendered
unconstitutional. In 1993 after Oregon v. Smith was decided, Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (1999), which
provides:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
The four-prong test found in Snyder repeats the two elements listed in the
exception clause above.
38 Lightman at 1015, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (not addressing whether C.P.L.R.
§4505 substantially burdened the Rabbis' exercise of their religion, nor if it was
the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest.
The court held that the Rabbis' actions were not an exercise of their religion.).
19 Id., 687 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (citing Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the
Unification of World Christianity, 119 A.D.2d 200, 203, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176
(2d Dep't 1986) where a cause of action was claimed for intentional infliction of
emotional distress which led to plaintiff's son committing suicide. The court in
Meroni stated that although the proselytizing practices of the church arose from
their beliefs, their conduct was not sufficiently outrageous nor beyond the
bounds of societal decency to warrant a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.).
' Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 654
N.Y.S.2d 791 (2d Dep't 1997). The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
employed an ordained Roman Catholic priest, who later sexually abused the
infant plaintiff. Id. at 161, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 793. The plaintiff argued that the
employee made statements as to his sexually deviant conduct to other priests,
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action for negligent supervision and retention of a church
employee. Tortious liability occurred readily in Kenneth P.
because examination of the issues would not require exploration of
any religious doctrine nor interfere with the practice of religion.4
Finally, the court quoted Alexander v. Culp42 that "public policy
supports an action for breach of confidentiality by [clergy]." 3 The
plaintiff appellant, Neil Alexander, met with the defendant
appellee, Reverend Harriet Culp, for marital counseling, and was
assured that his communication would remain confidential.' Culp
later disclosed to appellant's wife that Alexander was having an
affair and was contemplating a kidnapping of their children.4 The
Alexander court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for
negligence rather than the alleged action for clergy malpractice.6
The Lightman court noted that people should be able to confide
in their spiritual leaders, and expressed a significant societal
interest in promoting such confidences.47 Lightman also observed
that any privileged communication must be made while fulfilling a
religious capacity, and not just one stated in a secular
conversation.' Disclosure by the Rabbi was not required to
prevent Dr. Lightman from violating Jewish law. Rabbi Flaum
knew the couple had ceased marital relations, thus there was no
thus the plaintiff acquired a cause of action for negligent supervision and
retention. Id at 164, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
41 Id at 164-65, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 796. Cf Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 305 (1940) (where a Jehovah's witness was soliciting on the street, in
violation of a general regulation, the court held that the regulation would not be
subject to constitutional objection if it did not obstruct or delay the collection of
funds and did not involve any religious test, even if the "collection [were] for a
religious purpose." Id).
4 705 N.E.2d 378 (Cuyahoga County 1997).
4 Id at 382 (holding that a breach of confidentiality by a minister was
actionable for common law negligence, but not malpractice, and did not involve
nor compromise any religious tenets).
44 Id at 16,705 N.E.2d at 379.
45 Id, 705 N.E.2d at 379.
46 Id at 19, 705 N.E.2d at 382 (reasoning that "preserving appellant's
confidences neither involved nor compromised any religious tenets").
47 Lightman at 1017,687 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
4 See Drelich, 123 A.D.2d at 443, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 748, and supra text
accompanying note 10.
2000 585
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religious basis for disclosure. Rabbi Flaum could have
"emphasized to the husband the importance of ensuring that his
wife was still going to the Mikvah"49 rather than disclosing her
reasons for not going. The court established that there existed an
"overwhelming public and societal interest in preserving the
sanctity of such confidential communications '5 to members of the
clergy.
Even if the court found a religious purpose, preserving the
privilege outweighed the general concern of a negative impact on
the children if disclosure were not made. Preserving the privilege
outweighed the potential damage of Dr. Lightman violating Jewish
law or the need to shield the children from their mother's improper
conduct. The court found defendant's stated burden on religious
expression, "a negative impact on the children's 'level of religious
observance as well as their general well being,"' 5 was both general
and unimportant compared to the overwhelming "state and public
interest in preserving confidentiality." '52 It was outrageous and
offensive for the Rabbis to render public affirmations in the
Lightman's custody battle. The court found that "preventing the
husband from having relations with a woman 'who admittedly
socialized with other men' or in terms of the children, to shield
them 'from their mother's improper conduct'" would create a
standard the rest of society does not adhere to.53
The court held that, absent any religious purpose, the Rabbis
would be liable in tort for breach of the clergy-penitent privilege.
Since the court could find alternative means for the Rabbis to
achieve their religious goals without divulging the sensitive
4' Lightman at 1017, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
50 Id.
"I Id. The court lacked any discussion of a minimum level of burden
necessary to achieve the state interest or a general applicability of the C.P.L.R.
§4505 burden on everyone, probably because it does not apply to agnostic
persons. Id.
52 id.
" Id. The burden the rule placed on the Rabbis was minimal considering that
they "could have emphasized to the husband the importance of ensuring that his
wife was still going to the Mikvah." Id. Furthermore, the communication itself
revealed that all sexual activity with the husband had ended, thus there was no
reason to disclose to prevent violation of Jewish law or tradition. Id.
[Vol 16
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communications made, the court concluded that there could be no
religious purpose for the breach. The court finds no religious
justification for divulging plaintiff's socialization with men outside
of her marriage.' Unless the plaintiff waived the privilege, the
Rabbis must maintain the confidence. Therefore, the court held as
a matter of law that there was no religious purpose for the breach,
and absent a waiver, the Rabbis would be liable.5"
The original purpose of the evidentiary rule C.P.L.R. 4505 was
to protect confessions made to spiritual leaders, and to shield
spiritual leaders from contempt when they refused to testify about
communications made in spiritual context to them. 56 Sometimes
litigants attempted to misuse this privilege s7 but the. Lightman
court applied the statute as it was worded, in a manner backward
from the purpose. Disclosure without permission from the penitent
results in negligence per se, unless the disclosure has a religious
purpose, and then the analysis becomes more complicated.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff filed this case in federal court, the
Federal Rules of Evidence would not change the result. Rule 501
is a general privilege rule, which incorporates the common law
rules of each state.5" So, if the case were tried in federal district
54 Id., 687 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
5- Id., 687 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
56 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (McKinney 1992). Compare FED. R. EVID. 501
which states in pertinent part, ..... [I]n civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."
The Federal Rules of Evidence were originally submitted for approval to the
judiciary committee with individual privilege rules. The proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 506 was a clergy-congregant privilege. These rules were not
approved, and what remains in the federal system is rule 50 1, a general rule of
privileges based on common law. Thus the federal rule incorporates C.P.L.R.
§4504 in a civil action such as this one in the jurisdiction of New York.
' See Matter of Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160,417 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1979)
(cleric is required to testify concerning his activities to get an inmate in a work-
release program). But compare People v. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 612, 627
N.E.2d 959, 964, 606 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (1993) (although defendant appeared
to waive the clergy congregant privilege by making the same statement to
detectives, the defendants' admissions made to clergymen should not have been
admitted because they were made while obtaining spiritual guidance).
5" FED. R. EVID. 501. See also supra text accompanying note 56.
2000
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court in New York State, C.P.L.R. §4505 would still be applicable,
as would be the standards under the New York State Constitution,59
and the Federal Constitution.
Whether the statute is constitutional in the federal context, as
applied by Lightman, depends on the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court. A compelling governmental interest in preserving
the sanctity of confidential communications made to a spiritual
advisor appears to violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, because by fostering the communication, the statute
promotes a religion.60 The court's use of the statute fails the first
prong of the Lemon test,6' because it has a non-secular purpose
relating purely to persons of religion who make confidential
communications to their spiritual leaders.
C.P.L.R. 4505 also promotes religion by legally fostering a
reliance on the sanctity of privileged communications between
clergy and their congregation. The legal reliance is strengthened
by the Lightman court's use of the statute as actionable in tort.
Thus, it fails the second prong of the test, which requires that the
statute neither promotes nor inhibits religion.
Nevertheless, it may pass the third prong of the Lemon test, no
excessive government entanglement with religion, because
religious doctrine does not have to be examined in order to
determine whether C.P.L.R. 4505 is violated. The court applied
the standards of society when judging the actions of the Rabbis,
and did not consider their rights. The Rabbis' rights would have
been taken into account had the court analyzed the issue with
'9 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. This section provides in pertinent part:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or
credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance . . . of any school or
institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of
any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or
doctrine is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation
of children to and from any school or institution of learning.
Id.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " Id.
61 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-3 (1971). See supra text
accompanying note 29.
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respect to the Federal Constitution. In sum, from the way the court
applied the statute, one can conclude that the New York State
Constitution gives the penitent more rights than he or she has
under the Federal Constitution.
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